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THE TRUTH BEHIND GITMO†
By Scott Horton†
On his second day as president, Barack Obama acted on a promise
to close the detention facility that his predecessor opened in Guantánamo. He created an inter-agency task force to advise him on the specifics
of this process and to create future guidelines for the detention of terrorism suspects captured abroad. He set a deadline on the accomplishment
of this objective: one year. Today we are two weeks away from the issuance of the inter-agency task force’s report, and media commentators
tell us that almost no one expects that his goal of closing the facility in
one year can be met. Not meeting this self-imposed deadline will be portrayed by some, especially the superficial commentators who populate
the Beltway world, as a failure by the Obama Administration. But in
fact, as we meet here today Attorney General Holder is announcing a se†
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ries of prosecutions that will go forward quickly, one group in federal
court in New York and another before a military commission. The
framework of the Obama effort is quickly coming into shape.
Today, I would like to invite a new look at Guantánamo. And I’ll
start by asking a simple question: can we really bring the Guantánamo
debacle to a close without focusing careful attention on how it was set
up, what went on there, and drawing some conclusions about the past? I
think the answer to that question is clearly “no.” Yet Barack Obama tells
us we need to “look forwards, not backwards.” This has been a regular
response to calls for accountability stemming from the excesses of the
Bush Administration’s war on terror namely, torture and the mistreatment of prisoners, the operation of black sites and warrantless domestic
surveillance. This posture has been advised by his political counselors
Rahm Emanuel and David Axelrod. They believe that the President has
an affirmative agenda to push through Washington, starting with management of the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression,
reform of a catastrophically inefficient healthcare system and so forth.
The questions surrounding how the war on terror was managed in the
past will, in the Emanuel-Axelrod view, only take attention away from
the job at hand. In the eyes of the school of practical politics, this is a
perfectly reasonable perspective. But it will not help us bring Guantánamo to closure.
At present, the loudest voice opposing the President’s call to “look
forwards” is the same one which opposes the plan to close Guantánamo.
It comes from Vice President Dick Cheney, supplemented by his daughter Liz, and a number of figures from the last administration associated
with them. The Cheneys have even organized a lobbying entity called
Keep America Safe, raised money from a Florida real estate mogul (who
also, probably not coincidentally, chairs the Scooter Libby Defense
Committee), and plan to run television commercials attacking the Obama
Administration as weak on national defense because of its commitment
to close Guantánamo.
Significantly, the Cheneys call on us to look back at the last seven
years, and they are very proud of the accomplishments during this period
of time. They are proud of the use of “enhanced interrogation techniques,” which they argue saved thousands of American lives. They are
proud of Guantánamo, because it put an emphasis on intelligence gathering rather than weak justice ideas and kept Americans safe from the
“worst of the worst.” They are also proud of the conduct of the wars in
Iraq and Afghanistan, which they believe achieved U.S. objectives. They
have also turned to a series of tactical steps to try to frustrate the President’s plans and have indeed succeeded.
This crew disagreed throughout the Bush Administration that it
would be unpatriotic to obstruct the President’s conduct of the war on
terror by arguing against the strategies and plans that he formulated.
Once the baton has passed, however, they have attempted to obstruct
even the slightest deviation from their own calamitous course. If Guan-
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tánamo is not closed by February 2010, and I consider that likely, then
the number one reason for this is the relentless campaign of obstruction
the Cheneys and their allies have launched. At its center is fearmongering designed to convince Americans that putting
Guantánamo detainees in a supermax prison (from which no one has ever escaped) and having them stand trial in a federal court would result in
Americans being killed in their beds at night as they sleep. This notion is
so completely absurd that it should have provoked ridicule and laughter,
but it did not. And that is a testament to the capacity of our broadcast
media to absorb and disseminate utter absurdities. Legislation to bar the
transfer of Guantánamo prisoners to the continental United States was
introduced, and more recently Senators Graham, Lieberman and McCain
have put forward measures to stop the prosecution of Guantánamo detainees in federal courts or the paroling or release of prisoners to the United
States. Only in the last week was the Obama Administration able to secure sufficient authority to transfer prisoners to the United States to stand
trial.
Still, I agree with Vice President Cheney and disagree with
President Obama on this point: it is essential that we carefully consider
what was done at Guantánamo and form some judgments about it. In
fact, we will not move forward without doing this. Attempting a historical judgment is a duty - in fact, an imperative. We need to muster the
tools of the historian to look at them. We need to attempt, as best we
can, to be detached in our judgments. Our military colleagues call this
process “lessons learned.” Indeed, there is a great deal to be learned
from our experience with Guantánamo.
This process is particularly important for another reason: historical
falsification is a powerful weapon that has been wielded repeatedly in the
last hundred years to drive political discourse and shape destinies. In an
article published in the New York Times Magazine in 2004, Pulitzer
Prize-winning journalist Ron Suskind quoted a high-ranking advisor to
President Bush in these terms: “We’re an empire now, and when we act,
we create our own reality.” These remarks are widely credited to President Bush’s senior political advisor, the man dubbed his “brain,” Karl
Rove. What does it mean for a democratic society when a government
seeks to “create its own reality?
What does it mean to say a powerful government can “create its
own reality?” At the end of World War II, a number of the epoch’s most
profound chroniclers, such as George Orwell, Hannah Arendt, Theodor
W. Adorno and Victor Klemperer, looked back at the tumultuous period
that had just ended. They found it had been marked by an extraordinary
effort by great powers to “create their own reality,” an effort not really
matched in prior human history. This was done not only by domination
of the sources of information, but also by a systematic rewriting of history. It was of course the hallmark of the totalitarian states of the left and
right: Hitler’s Germany, Mussolini’s Italy, Tojo’s Japan, and Stalin’s Soviet Union. We should not, however, suppose that the noble Allies were
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entirely immune from the temptation either. To be sure, the essence of
the Orwellian nightmare lies in the fear that this process of creating an
independent reality would, propelled by the soaring
technologies of
the information age, come to dominate even the
democracies of the
West.
Hannah Arendt wrote first about this phenomenon in her study, “On
Totalitarianism.” Later, in the age of the Pentagon Papers and Vietnam
War, she realized that the political process of creating a pliant reality was
gaining a hold in America’s own culture. It was, she noted, a “crisis of
the republic,” though one, she thought, America’s institutions were
strong enough to cope with. That is a core observation of her vital essay,
“Lying and Politics.” Political lies, she reminds us, have been around as
long as there have been politicians. Indeed, the art of lying is an accepted part of politics and is viewed as matter of tradecraft, which begs
the following question: what is so menacing about political lying in the
world that emerged from World War II?
Arendt makes a number of observations that seem very well suited
to the world we find ourselves in now, the world of Rupert Murdoch and
cable news. The modern political liar will start with a claim that there is
no objective truth, but only subjective truth: liberal truth or conservative
truth, red truth or blue truth, Democratic truth or Republican truth. This
is the first step that leads to the destruction of historical objectivity. The
second step is the development of an at least somewhat paradoxical relationship to history. In fact the modern political liar is history-obsessed.
He needs to remake it to vindicate himself and to move things in the direction he seeks; he recognizes the power of historical memory. To use
Orwell’s simple, powerful formulation: “He who controls the present,
controls the past. He who controls the past controls the future.” Why
does Stalin have to airbrush Trotsky from Soviet history? Or to take the
example of the superlative Oscar-winning film, “The Lives of Others,”
why was it essential for East Germany to suppress statistical data about
suicides or to deny the existence of unemployment? These facts are inconsistent with the state’s official historical narrative. Hence they cannot
be. The third step that Arendt envisions is that the modern political liar
will inevitably use his power to try to turn his lies into reality. Arendt
considers this potentially the most horrifying of her theses about political
lying. She asks us to consider whether this may not literally fuel murders. These are all aspects of modern political lies, the new, far more virulent form of political lying that challenges our world.
For Arendt, this sort of lie is nothing less than a challenge to the
promise of democratic government. There are many examples, but one
can suffice here. As the Great War ended and a real democracy was introduced in Germany, the nation’s powerful and fundamentally antidemocratic conservative elements struck back, and they wielded history
as their essential weapon. Around the world, World War I was seen as
the consequence of German acts of provocation, starting with the
invasion of Belgium. For the German right, anyone even asking a ques-

THE TRUTH BEHIND GITMO
tion about the invasion of Belgium was a traitor. Moreover, Germany’s
defeat in World War I, they argued, resulted from a betrayal by the nation’s liberals, who sought to topple the Kaiser and introduce democracy.
Today, historians of modern Germany agree that this narrative was
nonsensical. In fact in the waning days of World War I, Germany had
become a de facto military dictatorship. Its democratic institutions were
in shambles with no meaningful consequence for the conduct of the war.
Why did Germany lose? The defeat may be ascribed to the entry of the
United States into the war, decisively tilting the balance. It may be
linked to technological innovations and access to critical resources. It
may persuasively be linked to tactical errors by the German General
Staff. Max Weber made a very convincing argument that a culture of
crippling secrecy that enveloped the General Staff and the war cabinet
had led to the entrenchment of mistakes and brought the country to defeat. One thing that cannot be credibly argued is that Germany’s democrats - a paltry group to start with - had anything meaningful to do with
it. Yet, the conservative counter-narrative, the “Stabbed-in-the-Back”
argument (or, the Dolchstoßlegende in German) was politically potent
and came to dominate the political discourse of the twenties, leading to
the ultimate triumph of the German far-right and collapse of the Weimar
Republic in 1933. And in the years that followed, the political potency
of the “Stabbed-in-the-Back” narrative was recognized and used around
the world. We can find it in the political discourse in France following
the fiasco in Algeria, and in the United States after the Vietnam War, to
cite just two instances. Fake history can be very potent politics.
So let us turn to the Guantánamo dilemma. There are a number of
competing narratives about Guantánamo. One was advanced by the
Bush Administration and is still put forward by Vice President Cheney.
In this narrative, the country was sunk into a wholly unanticipated war as
a result of the attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on 9/11,
which claimed nearly 3000 lives. Adapting quickly to a new kind of
warfare, the Administration saw the need to create a detention facility
where the worst of the worst of the 9/11 terrorists could be held indefinitely and used for intelligence gathering so that future attacks like 9/11
could be thwarted. As General Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said in a 2002 press conference, these individuals are the
types of people who would “chew through the hydraulic brake cables of
a jet to try to bring it down if not restrained in transportation.” The
people held at Guantánamo would be dyed-in-the-wool terrorists determined to kill Americans, and all the arrangements there would turn on
one key consideration – i.e., the safety and security of American citizens.
These special arrangements were necessary because of the weakness of
our court system and criminal justice system, which allow the guilty to
escape. These same arrangements were also justified by our overriding
need for intelligence, which would efficiently be collected from these
terrorists in the Guantánamo setting. Guantánamo was
innovative,
and it was essential to American security. Likewise, new tribunals
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would be set up that would deal swiftly and efficiently with those
charged. They would not get the same benefits as legitimate prisoners of
war or even defendants in an American courtroom. Rather, they would
get effective justice. Remember, they are all terrorists and no one doubts
their guilt.
There is also an emerging alternative narrative. The decision to
create Guantánamo focused from the outset on the evasion of international and U.S. law the Constitution and the criminal code books, and
even the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Certainly some of the prisoners held there were serious terrorists, but a far larger number, maybe
80 percent of the inmate population, was not. They were individuals
caught up in a very loose dragnet that the Americans laid, or they were
pure innocents, often sold by tribal chieftains and by
Pakistan’s
notorious Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) for payments that the Americans offered. The system operated with complete indifference to the
guilt or innocence of those held there. Moreover, the vilification of the
prisoners in Guantánamo served the Administration’s domestic political
objectives of spiking public fear from terrorism. Guantánamo would also be an experimentation chamber for new techniques designed to gather
information by “breaking” the subject, with a focus on the importation
of techniques formerly used by U.S. enemies including the Soviet Union,
Communist China, North Korea and North Vietnam. These included water boarding, long-time standing, hypothermia, sleep deprivation, sensory
deprivation followed by sensory overload and prolonged isolation. The
government argued that these techniques would help it secure vital intelligence, but in fact when torture techniques were applied, prisoners said
whatever they suspected their interrogators wanted them to say. The military commissions were designed from the outset with two major objectives: the first was to insure convictions, and the second was to keep secret the manner in which the prisoners were treated, and particularly the
use of torture techniques.
So which of these narratives is more faithful to the truth? That will
be a judgment for historians to make, but we will never get to a reasoned
assessment without some serious engagement with unpleasant facts. At
this point, the case for the official narrative looks very weak. Let us just
look at the most fundamental issue: who were the prisoners? Were they
really the “worst of the worst?” Today, it is reasonably clear that from
the early days of the facility, certainly from mid-2002, the
Administration was told by intelligence experts that the prisoners held at
Guantánamo were by and large not the ringleaders of Al Qaeda and the
Taliban. A handful were high-ranking members of the Al Qaeda or the
Taliban, others were probably third or fourth-tier actors, and a much
larger number, (probably a majority of the prisoners) were innocent
people who never should have been incarcerated and who had only tangential relations with the targeted terrorist groups.
How do we know this? Not from human rights attorneys or defense
counsel. We know this from America’s most senior intelligence profes-
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sionals. Crack CIA counterterrorism experts had extensive opportunities
to interrogate any Guantánamo prisoner they wanted to interrogate.
They availed themselves of this. Jane Mayer, in her book The Dark Side,
recounts that in the summer of 2002, a CIA study based on careful review of the Guantánamo detainees had concluded that fully one-third of
the prison population had no connection to terrorism
whatsoever and
that a majority of the balance had only a very tenuous connection. The
study’s authors called for a careful review and the release of a large
number of prisoners. In the fall, a meeting was arranged between National Security Council staffers who had reviewed the CIA report and Alberto Gonzales, the President’s personal lawyer. Gonzales was flanked by
David Addington, Dick Cheney’s confidant, and another White House
lawyer, Tim Flanigan. Addington delivered the following response: “No,
there will be no review. The president has determined that they are all
enemy combatants. We are not going to revisit it.” That was the end of
the matter.
But that was not all. We now know through Freedom of
Information Act disclosures that the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) also attempted a review and reconciliation of its interview notes in
roughly the same period and reached conclusions identical to the CIA’s.
The FBI also raised very serious concerns about the use of torture techniques at Guantánamo and sought confirmation of guidance given preliminarily from senior FBI agents at Guantánamo not to participate in sessions at which torture techniques were used. These conclusions and a
description of the torture techniques observed were passed to Director
Robert Mueller, and then to the Assistant Attorney General responsible
for the Criminal Division at the Justice Department, Michael Chertoff. It
got the same reaction, and it appears that Chertoff, in subsequent Congressional testimony, falsified the essence of the briefing he got from the
FBI, apparently to avoid any conflict with the position staked out by the
White House.
If the interrogation experts from the CIA and the FBI were saying
that most of the prisoners were either innocent or at least not the serious
figures America was trying to capture, why would political figures in the
White House take a different position? John Yoo often wields that argument. “Why,” he asks with a perverse sort of logic that reverses the
proof burden, “would the Administration hold people who are innocent?”
I think there is one feasible answer to that question: a partisan political
calculus. The White House wanted to avoid the embarrassment of acknowledging a mistake in the apprehension of terrorists, but it also saw
valuable political benefit from the climate of fear that the terrorists,
whose unshaven and menacing faces regularly flashed on American TV
screens (especially Fox News), offered the President and his party. In
fact in the fall 2002 elections, just as Addington was saying no to the
idea of a review of who was held at Guantánamo, the GOP scored
impressive gains in Congress and in statehouses around the country. The
war on terror and support for the President’s handling of the war made

8 PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION [Vol. 1:9 2010]
up almost the entire GOP campaign platform. It was, in fact, very effective politics. And in 2004, as Bush sought re-election, the GOP pursued
the same angle, even as the force of arguments about the conduct of the
war began to wear off. A proper assessment of what happened cannot
ignore the fact that in an electoral democracy, political actors measure
their conduct to the perceived effect it will have on elections. Sometimes that helps assure obedience to the popular will. Other times,
though, it leads to crass and demagogic conduct, as was the case with the
Guantánamo prisoners.
Nevertheless, there is more essential evidence for the view that a
majority of the prisoners were innocent and that the mistakes made in the
process can be traced right to the top. First we have information collected from Pakistan by intrepid journalists like Ahmed Rashid. As he
summarized in Descent into Chaos, Rashid learned from senior Pakistani
sources, including some in the ISI, that by early 2002, the Pakistani generals who had built the Taliban and equivocally supported its alliance
with Al Qaeda were focused on how to deal with American anger and
resolve. The generals believed that they needed to play a waiting game,
offering just enough to the Americans to appease them and hold them at
bay. They would then be able to reenter Afghanistan and reestablish a
government managed by their Taliban proxies. They quickly concluded
that they could identify a “mark” in the Bush Administration - a key decision-maker who was influential enough to shape policy and yet gullible
enough to buy their very dubious bill of goods. Their mark was Vice
President Dick Cheney.
Pakistan’s generals first tested this thesis in the early days of the
Afghan war, in mid-November 2001. U.S. forces and their allies on the
ground had forced the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies in the north to
withdraw to the city of Kunduz, their last redoubt, where they were surrounded and under siege. ISI concluded that unless it acted quickly, the
entire leadership of the Taliban and many of the leaders of Al Qaeda
would be wiped out. General Pervez Musharraf relayed an urgent appeal
to the White House: “Give us a moratorium on bombing Kunduz and let
us open an air corridor so we can get some military transports in to
withdraw our Pakistani military attachés who are with the Taliban, so
they won’t be killed.” Cheney listened patiently to the request and gave
the green light. The bombardment of Kunduz ceased and Pakistan was
able to land military transports there to evacuate key personnel. The key
personnel evacuated did include some Pakistani advisors but also key
leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Rashid puts the number of evacuated terrorist leaders at certainly hundreds, and perhaps as many as a
thousand. A flabbergasted American commander witnessing the whole
scene dubbed it “Operation Evil Airlift.” Cheney insisted on top secret
classification for the whole operation. Even other cabinet members were
not briefed about it.
The Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders whose capture was a top priority,
the people for whom Guantánamo was being built, were evacuated away
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to safety right under the nose of the U.S. forces, courtesy of Dick Cheney. (pp. 91-93, a similar account by Seymour Hersh appeared in _The
New Yorker_). The ISI squirreled them away quickly in a number of different locations in Pakistan’s Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan.
ISI leadership also appreciated the Bush Administration’s need to
claim it had captured key players, and indeed this was the price of continued good relations with the United States. Payment came not just in
the form of bounty fees paid over to the Pakistani military, but also in
roughly $10 billion in aid, most of which went to the Pakistani military
in an untraceable form. The ISI decided, Rashid notes, to be sure that the
Americans got bodies, but it insured that they would be nobodies. While
Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders were being sheltered, the Pakistanis turned
over to the Americans stray Arab tourists, taxi drivers, shepherds and
others who got in their way. They bragged about helping Americans
snag key players, but in fact they were doing just the opposite, comfortable all along that the Americans were simply too gullible to know the difference.
In the key period of 2002-03, when the U.S. should have been capturing Osama bin Laden, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, Mullah Omar and other
Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, instead it was collecting innocents and
people with marginal connections and proclaiming them the “worst of
the worst.” The intensive rhetoric was necessary in fact to cover for the
failure of U.S. efforts to get its targets, a failure that resulted from gross
incompetence in the White House.
The real disclosure of these wretched facts, however, had to wait for
at least three more years. Notably, it came neither through the investigative work of a congressional committee (congressional oversight failed
almost totally during this period) nor through the work of some exposé
journalists. Instead, it came through the work of law students and their
professors, people just like you in the audience today, just across the
Hudson River at Seton Hall University in New Jersey. They issued a series of impressive reports, with the first and most significant being “A
Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of
Department of Defense
Data” published on February 8, 2006. The report established that very
few of the Guantánamo prisoners had been captured by Americans; most
had been turned over by bounty hunters out for a fee or by Pakistani authorities. A second report followed in March, noting that prisoners were
being classified as terrorists based on their affiliations with organizations
which were not, in fact, scheduled terrorist
organizations. This
second report suggested either that members of terrorist organizations
were being let into the country without control (because of the absence of
these organizations from the No Fly List) or that the prisoners were not
in fact members of terrorist organizations. That final conclusion is the
clearly more compelling one. A third report from July 2006, followed by
another in August 2006, looked at suicide and self-harm incidents, providing another grim look at conditions at the camp, and prompting some
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of the most absurd rebuttals from the Rumsfeld Pentagon. Subsequent
reports looked at the Combat Status Review Tribunals and demonstrated
conclusively that they had been used abusively to reverse determinations
by Military Commissions that prisoners were not enemy combatants; at
the “urban legend” propagated by the Pentagon and by figures like Justice Scalia about recidivism from released Guantánamo prisoners. It follows from these studies that for roughly 80 percent of the prisoners there
is little evidence to support Government claims that the individual is a
terrorist or a member of Al Qaeda or the Taliban.
The Seton Hall reports were harshly attacked by the Rumsfeld Pentagon and by its associated media, particularly Fox News. However, we
are now close to the point of being able to say definitively that the reports are not only accurate on their face, but also offer a solid indicator
of how a fair court would resolve these cases.
We can say this on the basis of habeas corpus cases processed to
date. A total of thirty eight cases have now gone through the federal
district court level with final determinations. All cases went to district
court judges in the District of Columbia, which may be the single most
conservative trial bench in the United States. All of the judges hearing
these cases were Republican nominees and several of them were
appointed by George W. Bush. In thirty cases, the court concluded that
the government did not have an adequate basis to justify the prisoner’s
detention, even on the sharply reduced standard of habeas corpus. In just
eight cases was the government able to make out a sufficient case to justify continued detention. The prisoner’s habeas corpus success rate
matches the Seton Hall study. Notably, this followed three years of
steady wind-down of the population at Guantánamo and involved cases
where the government was convinced it has a solid case. In other words,
even accepting the Seton Hall numbers, we could have expected a better
performance for the government.
I want to dig a bit into one case, which seems to exemplify what we
have learned through the habeas process. It involves a Kuwaiti national
named Fouad al-Rabiah. It was decided at the end of September by
Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, a no-nonsense conservative Reagan appointee. The prosecutors called al-Rabiah a terrorist, but for the defense
he was a Kuwaiti Airlines manager stuck at the wrong place and the
wrong time. Judge Kollar-Kotelly reviewed the evidence and had no difficulty making the ruling. Al-Rabiah was to be released “forthwith.”
There was no basis for his detention. The judge was disturbed by the
way he was treated in Guantánamo, even though she is precluded by security classifications from describing it in public documents.
Al-Rabiah had been examined with care by a CIA agent shortly after his arrival in Guantánamo. The conclusion: this is an innocent man
who should not be held.
Government officials, lacking any evidence to justify the detention
of a man who was almost certainly innocent, decided they needed something to justify his detention. The government insists that no torture was
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involved. What was done to al-Rabiah remains super-secret, and the interests of national security preclude its disclosure. Nevertheless, prolonged sleep deprivation, and isolation, the use of extreme heat and cold,
short-shackling in painful stress positions, forced nudity, forced grooming, religious and sexual humiliation, and the use of loud music and noise
were all part of the standard operating procedure at Guantánamo. Admittedly, they would have been applied in combination on a prisoner like alRabiah with the objective of “breaking” him and securing false testimony.
Under such treatment, al-Rabiah proceeded to confess to every act
the prosecutors needed for their case. The judge concluded that the confessions were “entirely incredible” and that the government’s case
against al-Rabiah rested on a series of almost absurd contentions that had
no basis other than the torture-induced confessions (The judge avoids use
of the word “torture.” She focuses only on credibility.) Although “alRabiah’s interrogators ultimately extracted confessions from him,” she
writes, they themselves “never believed his confessions based on the
comments they included in their interrogation reports.” The judge pulled
this piece from the transcript of one of al-Rabiah’s interrogations. The
interrogator states: There is nothing against you. But there is no innocent
person here. So, you should confess to something so you can be charged
and sentenced and serve your sentence and then go back to your family
and country, because you will not leave this place innocent.
As Hannah Arendt said, the modern political liar will use all the
power he has to make his lies into the truth. Here, we see a clear demonstration of that principle. Al-Rabiah was tortured to extract confessions
that would make him out to be a terrorist, even though he was not one.
The same sure and nauseating logic that drove the show trials of the thirties and early fifties was in charge in Guantánamo. The difference was
the integrity of the military, FBI and CIA interrogators, who clearly and
repeatedly noted that they did not believe the
confessions, and the
integrity of the courts, which have been able to ferret out and reject torture-tainted evidence.
This long review of how we got to Guantánamo is important for
several reasons. It helps us understand why the Bush White House before, and Dick Cheney today, have been so vehement in their rhetoric
about Guantánamo. They made gross mistakes and they have a lot to
cover up. The essence of the Guantánamo story is that the Administration
failed in its principal objective of seizing and holding the “worst of the
worst” Al Qaeda terrorists who remain at large. Rather than accept that
fact and release the innocent, they resolved to use all the tools at their
disposal to make the prisoners at Guantánamo into the “worst of the
worst.”
This review also helps us understand why a perfectly reasonable solution will entail releasing a very large part of the prisoners.
We are now down to the last two weeks before release of the task
force report. What is going to come?
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First, the Obama Administration is putting a stress on identifying
the major cases in which solid evidence exists of serious criminal
wrongdoing. These cases will be brought in federal courts, probably
most of them in the Southern District of New York. This will include
cases which previously were being prepared in the Military Commissions
with charges like material support and attempted homicide on a member
of the U.S. armed forces. The death penalty will be sought in the most
serious of these cases.
Second, the Military Commissions will continue, and cases based
on straightforward violations of the laws of armed conflict will be referred to them. That is theoretical. As best I can see from reviewing the
cases about which something is known, I have not identified a single one
which is appropriate for trial before a military commission. The AP is
reporting this morning that there will be five such cases, including Abd
al-Rahim al-Nashiri, the alleged bomber of the USS Cole, but let us wait
to see what charges result before judging this effort. Some civil
libertarians will reflexively object to any use of the military commissions
and will call them kangaroo courts. The evidence now shows that the
Bush Administration did attempt to turn the commissions into kangaroo
courts. It also shows that the military judges, prosecutors and defense
counsel who drive the system resisted this effort, often valiantly and at
the expense of their own careers. There is no reason why commissions,
properly constituted, cannot produce results every bit as fair as the federal courts. A recent study by NYU Law School's Center on Law and Security shows that they are actually a more favorable forum for defendants
than federal criminal courts, which is another reason why a prosecutor
would want to steer the more serious cases into court.
Third, the process of returning Guantánamo prisoners to their home
countries or another suitable location will continue. This effort will focus on prisoners who are either innocent or at least “not so guilty.” In
other words, there may be some information suggesting a connection to
terrorist groups that are not considered major risks or are of no particular
concern to the United States. The biggest group in this batch consists of
the Yemenis, and I expect an arrangement will be made to return them to
Yemen notwithstanding U.S. queasiness about the intentions of the Yemeni government. Notwithstanding the rhetorical differences between
the Obama and Bush Administrations, this actually presents a point of
strong continuity. The process of returning Yemeni detainees to their native land commenced under Bush in 2006. Obama is simply carrying it
forward.
Fourth, the habeas corpus process will continue, and the
government will implement the decisions of the courts, taking appeals
when appropriate.
Much discussion has focused on a so-called fifth case, consisting of
individuals who “we know are guilty” but we feel we cannot charge for
paucity of evidence or concern about exposure of intelligence sources
and methods in the process. Elaborate efforts were prepared to create a

THE TRUTH BEHIND GITMO
regime of preventive detention to cover this group. I am pleased to note
that the Obama Administration appears to have now rejected the
preventive detention approach. What are the alternatives?
I am skeptical about this “fifth category.” In particular, if we “know
they are guilty,” I believe a way can be found to charge and try them.
The NYU Law School study I just mentioned shows that the Bush Administration actually amassed a strong track record in charging counterterrorism cases and obtaining convictions in cases in which there was only scant evidence of connection to terrorist organizations. Moreover,
James Benjamin’s study, which he discussed this morning, has completely demolished the Bush Administration’s arguments to the effect that
federal criminal proceedings cannot serve the needs of prosecutors. Over
the course of the last four years, I have repeatedly been taken aside by
government figures and told “if you knew what we knew about Mr. X,
you wouldn’t be raising questions about this case. He’s guilty, even
though we have some problems with this case.” Well, one of those cases
was Fouad al-Rabiah. I am convinced at this point that many of those
tough cases, where they’re sure of guilt but the evidence just doesn’t
work, actually involve people who are innocent, and often enough people
who were tortured, and where evidence of torture will complicate the trial. Moreover, a system which guarantees that the government wins
every case has nothing to do with justice. Consequently, I doubt that this
“fifth category” actually exists. Even without a special proposal by the
Obama Administration for preventive detention measures, it has some
options to continue to hold persons who are not tried, and even persons
who are tried and acquitted. If it has evidence that they are enemy combatants, it can, for instance, hold them under the laws of armed conflict
until the hostilities have ceased.
The loudest voice on the national stage right now on the
Guantánamo issue is Dick Cheney’s. The wisest voices, however, have
been roughly two dozen retired generals and admirals who assembled in
Washington a month ago where General Harry Soyster, the longtime
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said that “Barack Obama
should make good on his promise,” Guantánamo has been a recruiting
poster for terrorist organizations, and it has been a stain on the good
reputation of the American military. It was established by violently subverting two centuries of American military doctrine. The best course
now is to wipe it away as quickly as possible. My friend Admiral John
Hutson offered another vital comment. No one doubts that there are a
few dozen serious terrorists at Guantánamo. It serves the interests of the
United States and the interests of justice for these individuals to be
quickly charged for the crimes they committed, if possible in federal
courts and, if not, before military commissions, for convincing evidence
to be brought forward and for their guilt to be swiftly established. Nothing is more important right now than for the Obama Administration to
renew America’s commitment to justice. That means releasing the innocent, but it also means securing the conviction and sentencing of the
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guilty through a process that embraces our fundamental values.

